ABSTRACT
This chapter begins with a critical discussion of the cost of Britain’s military involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan in terms of the lives lost and the vast amounts of money expended before it goes on to consider criticisms of the conduct of both the initial military operations and the reconstruction that was supposed to follow victory. This critique involves a broader analysis of the internal contradictions in the underlying strategy, the inadequacy and fragmented nature of planning for post-conflict reconstruction, the failure to share knowledge and accept departmental ownership and the chronic over-optimism of those charged with these responsibilities – particularly the heads of the Armed Forces. On this basis, the chapter explains that this book is concerned not with the substance of British defence policy but rather with the process by which it is made and which can deliver such disastrous outcomes; a subject which has been too long neglected in the literature. It concludes with a brief discussion of methodological issues concerning the definition of defence policy and the bureaucratic context in which it is made.
