ABSTRACT
This chapter scrutinizes how and why the Chinese Nationalists pulled back from their primary arena of confrontation in the Taiwan Strait around the mid-1950s to display to the rest of Asia their anticommunist prowess, and how that effort complicated rather than facilitated the alliance between Taipei and Washington. Chiang Kai-shek’s intention to extend ideological influence abroad and create a strong image of himself as Asia’s unequivocal leader in the fight against world communism originated from a diplomatic crisis that, ironically, had implicated his regime in secret dealings with the Chinese Communists. Exporting anticommunism to the rest of Asia was supposedly aimed at reinforcing Taipei’s position in Asia’s Cold War theater. But Chiang’s gambit, the result of which was mixed, was not always in accordance with America’s overall policy in that region. His effort to embed Taiwan deep into a wider, ideologically driven Asian security network did not necessarily elevate Taiwan’s already troubled position in the world community. A disclosure of Taipei’s Cold War endeavors thus demonstrates an unfamiliar political, military, and diplomatic scenario that might change the way we view the region and the U.S.–Taiwan relations in a world of polarized confrontation.
