ABSTRACT
Many analysts have maintained that Washington’s alliance with the island-based Nationalist China during the Cold War was a mistake and that it injured more than it benefitted the United States. This book represents a small effort to explain how and why that discord happened, how the Chinese Nationalists perceived their asymmetric partnership with the United States, what they did in order to consolidate their position in Asia’s Cold War theater, and how they endeavored to pursue an independent external policy free from American influence for the survival of their island state and regime. Nowadays, as Taiwan is seen by many Americans as an important ally in their Indo-Pacific strategy useful in containing the PRC’s rise, this study hopefully will serve as a first step toward comprehending the nature of U.S.–Taiwan relations, as well as the mindsets and behaviors of top leaders in Taipei. With the availability of more declassified archival materials in the future, a much clearer picture of the true U.S.–Taiwan relationship in the post-Cold War era might become a possibility.
