ABSTRACT
This chapter is concerned with objectual faith. The discussion begins by showing that while objectual faith is often three-place, i.e. where S has faith in A with respect to r, faith can also be two-place, i.e. it is possible for S to simply have faith in A. Second, it is argued that objectual faith in A does not, in general, require belief or acceptance of a proposition about A: objectual faith can be noncognitive, though objectual faith is usually accompanied by salient cognitive propositional attitudes towards A. Third, objectual faith is not reducible to propositional faith, nor is propositional faith reducible to objectual faith. Fourth, the true grit account is extended to objectual faith: objectual faith, like propositional faith, exhibits the alignment and resoluteness constraints. Fifth, while resolute trust may be sufficient for objectual faith, it can be realised by other attitudes, notably by hope, openness or investment. The proposed account is pluralist: different objectual attitudes can be resolutely aligned to their object and meet the requirements for faith.
