ABSTRACT
The Suez Crisis was no end of a lesson for the British and French. Eden’s belief that the use of force could secure the canal was an illusion. So was the French belief that the overthrow of Nasser would assist their efforts to retain Algeria. Their joint military attack on Egypt failed because of the lack of American support rather than for any military reason. Additionally the Israelis were forced back to the starting line, giving up all their gains, as a result of US pressure. President Nasser emerged, despite Egypt’s indifferent military performance, as the unambiguous diplomatic winner, a new hero to the developing and non-aligned world for defeating the European colonial powers. But the Americans cannot regard their exertion of power as an unqualified success. Their assumption that Nasser would moderate and become a conventional statesman was hopelessly over-optimistic. Just 11 years later the Americans would support the Israelis and oppose Nasser during the Six-Day War. And American hostility to their nominal European allies would raise doubt as to their reliability which helped to spur the emergence of the European Community as a separate source of geostrategic power.
