ABSTRACT
Soviet foreign policy between the wars was characterised by a preference for accommodation with Germany. The 1922 Rapallo Pact established a cordial co-operation and Stalin hoped that this would continue after 1933 once Hitler had assumed power. Only when Hitler appeared intent on pursuing an anti-Soviet policy, establishing the anti-Comintern Pact, did Stalin gravitate towards the policy of ‘Popular Fronts’ to oppose fascism. But despairing of Western appeasement, and alarmed by the Munich Agreement of 1938, Stalin rekindled the spirit of Rapallo by agreeing the Nazi–Soviet Pact in August 1939. The objective of preserving Soviet territorial integrity while the capitalist powers were at war with each other appeared a notable success. Alas, Stalin came to regard the Pact as permanent while Hitler regarded it as a temporary expedient. Consequently Stain failed to heed the warnings of the impending Germany attack in June 1941. He ignored Churchill who informed him of German intentions. He ignored his own military and security services who pinpointed the date of the German assault. He ignored German defectors who provided similar intelligence. The Soviet Union was thus taken by surprise when Hitler launched Operation Barbarossa losing more territory and lives than would otherwise have been the case.
