ABSTRACT
Cognitive explanations raise epistemological problems not faced by accounts confined to observable variables. Hence, intentional behaviorism sharply distinguishes extensional reasoning, which eschews reference to intentional idioms, from intentional inference which rests explicitly on mental events. This is a fundamental distinction and intentional interpretation requires reasoned justification precisely because the variables on which it relies are not directly available for empirical examination. Intentional behaviorism is, therefore, a philosophically based strategy and this chapter grounds its stages conceptually. The first stage, theoretical minimalism, is founded upon a behaviorally based extensional methodology; the second, interpretative stage, is founded on mentally inferred intentionality; and the third stage, neurophysiologically based evaluation, is based on a biologically founded mode of extensional explanation. Philosophical bases of each stage of the strategy are described for theoretical minimalism (the understanding of behavior), intentional interpretation (action), and neurophysiological evaluation (choice). Their incommensurability, a leitmotiv for the book, is also raised and discussed. Russell’s distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description is reviewed as a prelude to the account of the nature of consumer choice in Chapter 4.
