ABSTRACT
A concern for donor autonomy (often glossed as donor “voluntariness”) underpins one of the most common objections to plasma (or blood) donor compensation: That if a person is motivated to donate by the offer of compensation, then her autonomy with respect to her donation will be diminished as she will have thereby been coerced, or forced, into donating. This chapter develops an argument that focuses on the question of whether presenting a person with an inducement could result in the diminution of her autonomy and concludes that it could. It supports the claim that inducements (or offers) can (like threats) lead to a diminution in the autonomy of those who accept (or succumb to) them. But this conclusion leads to a problem: Since both threats and offers can function similarly to diminish the autonomy of those that succumb to (or accept) them how can we distinguish between morally permissible and morally impermissible proposals? This chapter answers this question by focusing on the conditions that must be met for a person to consent. In so doing it establishes that offers of compensation to plasma donors are unlikely to be coercive. Instead, it is the prohibition of such offers that is coercive.
