ABSTRACT
In our previous summary section, we began by making a brief digression, in order to recall some of the points about our understanding of ideology that were made in the introductory chapter to this study. This was done in order to create a framework for analysing the important issue of continuity versus change in Soviet development. With the help of our thus constructed model of ‘Soviet Loyalty’ we sought to establish two vital points. First, it was shown that a number of structural and behavioural patterns did indeed exhibit a remarkable continuity between the respective Stalin and Khrushchev periods, so much so in fact that we found it warranted to conclude that Khrushchev’s ‘tinkering’ had not succeeded, in any fundamental respect, in altering the working principles of the basic Stalinist model. Our second point concerned those changes that actually were made. Here it was argued that the legacy left by Khrushchev contained the important feature of crossing off the agenda a number of previously available policy options. In a sense, Brezhnev could thus be seen to have found himself in a worse position than did Khrushchev at the time of his take-over.
