ABSTRACT
Lipset posits that a non-democratic regime must preserve the capacity to ‘engender and maintain the belief that existing political institutions are the most appropriate or proper ones for society.’ In such regimes, an institutional system (e.g., formal and informal rules) primarily serves the interests of the leader and their inner circle. For leaders of personalistic regimes, it is easier to modify the institutional system through formal and informal adjustments. In contrast, institutions are less likely to be adjusted to the needs of a particular leader in military and dominant-party rule regimes. The strategies for preserving political stability and the role of institutions vary across different political regimes, affecting the design and practice of federalism and decentralization. This is exemplified by the contrasting approaches of dominant-party regimes, such as China and the Soviet Union, and personalistic autocracies like Russia and Kazakhstan. The enforcement of institutions in non-democratic regimes, particularly those based on personal rule, differs fundamentally from regimes.
