ABSTRACT
The chapter examines the reciprocal dynamics between personalistic regimes and institutions of federalism and decentralization. It posits that the non-democratic nature of personalistic regimes determines the role, limitations, and stability of center-regional relations, as well as the resilience of formal institutions. The chapter considers institutions of federalism and decentralization as dependent variables and the characteristics of non-democratic regimes as independent variables. It applies the logic of strategic institutional choices to the institutions of federalism and decentralization in non-democracies. In personalistic systems, such models may be stable but consistently fragile, as preserving the undemocratic nature of all institutional system components is crucial for stability. Electoral falsifications are required even when popular support for the regime is high enough to win elections without resorting to rigging. However, the regime must constantly convince potential supporters of the opposition not just of its popularity but of its super-popularity and stability, applying that there is no chance to challenge it.
