ABSTRACT
This chapter examines the strategies adopted by various Korean nationalist leaders to form an alliance with the US. The chapter outlines how US officials were hostile to the close relations between the Korean Provisional Government and the Kuomintang government of China. Despite protestations to the contrary, US officials, especially those in the State Department, refused to believe that the Koreans were prepared to sever connections with the Chinese in favour of an alliance with the US. Furthermore, some US officials during World War II were hostile to the anti-communist stance of Korean leaders and amazingly equated anti-Soviet sentiment with anti-US sentiment. Kim Gu and Jo So-Ang fixated on persuading the State Department, which of all US government agencies was adverse to cooperating with the Korean nationalists. They furthermore made the mistake of telling US officials that they prioritized recognition and aid from all four Allied powers, rather than emphasizing what they really wanted, a special relationship with the US. Syngman Rhee on the other hand concentrated his efforts on those US government agencies that were sympathetic to the Korean cause and via his personal connections and influence over officials in the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) managed to facilitate military cooperation between the US and the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea (KPG) in 1945.
