ABSTRACT
In this concluding section, I would like to achieve three things. First, I would like to assess the broad outline of U.S. Peace Processes against the so-called Liberal Peace. In doing so, I seek to demonstrate the extent to which U.S. practice diverges from an established model and template and to also demonstrate the extent to which it fails to acknowledge, let alone meet, minimum conditions for a meaningful peace.
Second, I would then like to return to the Critical literature on peacebuilding that was initially engaged in the first chapter. In doing so, I would like to demonstrate how these contributions can provide insight into the concrete practices of U.S. strategists and policymakers. In doing so, I hope to demonstrate how critiques of Liberal peacebuilding can also be applied to U.S. Peace Processes. This, I envisage, will make it possible to move beyond critiques that focus entirely on practical implementation. Finally, I bring matters to a close with some concluding observations.
