ABSTRACT
Chapter 2 is about the doctrine that there are ulterior selves, defined as selves, analogous to ours, of which material objects are composed. This doctrine was proposed by Leibniz, and is one to which panpsychists appear to be committed. I consider and reject what seem to be the three most plausible arguments for its truth. The first argument invokes the principle that there are in nature no radical discontinuities. The second rests on the claim that it is simpler to suppose that all substances are selves or groups than that while some are others are not. The third is roughly this. A material object must have an intrinsic property, such as a colour, as well as a causal or structural or dispositional property of the kind attributed to it by science; the only available intrinsic property is a property of consciousness; there can be no consciousness without a subject, and this subject must be a self. I reply to this by defending the thesis that substantial nonselves can have intrinsic colour qualities.
