ABSTRACT
There are limits on the permissible means for enforcing the right to exclude. However, first, such moral limitations imposed on enforcement rights do not translate into limitations on the underlying right to exclude itself. That certain means to prevent an unauthorized migrant from entering are impermissible therefore does not give the migrant a moral right or permission to enter. Second, while there are limits to the liability of unauthorized migrants to defensive force, their liability can be substantial. Third, if one presupposes, conversely, that immigration restrictions are unjust, then there will be circumstances where (legally) unauthorized migrants can justifiably resist immigration officers trying to stop them from entering, and even resist with considerable force. Yet certain analogies offered to not just presuppose but support the claim that attempts to prevent entry can amount to unjust attacks triggering the right to defensive force are misleading. Moreover, the implications of the underlying account of self-defense render it philosophically implausible and politically dangerous. Fourth, appeals to the internal costs of enforcement are just as incapable of undermining the right to exclude and the justifiability of its enforcement as are appeals to the costs imposed on the migrants. Enforcement-based arguments against immigration restrictions fail.
