ABSTRACT
Ricoeur argues for the existence of a ‘self’ that could ground rights distinct from the ‘self’ posited by liberal theory. This chapter explicates his notion of ‘self as ipse’ (that is, a changeable ipse-self which exists alongside an idem-identity concerned with sameness). It considers how narrative identity constructs a ‘life’ for the self, relates it to other selves and contextualises it in broader cultural narratives – which together ensure temporal continuity of the self as a site of ethical judgements. The purest expression of ipseity is promising: using one’s freedom to commit to binding the self. It is argued that the question of rights appears at the intersection of a capable self, and (self-)esteem and (self-)respect: in turn these qualities, which facilitate promising, reveal the essentially relational and reciprocal nature that constitutes the self. The capable self must be mediated through others: and this is the bridging move that leads to the subject bearing rights. Meanwhile attestation is the self’s way of dealing with suspicion or doubt about itself: respect and esteem afforded to the self go along with ascribing it rights, and accordingly any framework for rights must go beyond the boundaries of the self. Finally, the chapter offers an expansive concept of ‘life’ as the hermeneutical expression of subjectivity distinct from the liberal tradition. [PH]
