ABSTRACT
This chapter articulates how Hans-Georg Gadamer conceives of the task of philosophy in light of his account of meanings as events. The chapter begins by considering the objection, raised by Günter Figal and Pavlos Kontos, that Gadamer describes philosophy in such practical terms that he is left unable to distinguish it as a theoretical enterprise. Figal and Kontos are indeed right that, on Gadamer’s view, philosophy is similar to practical reasoning in a number of respects, and not least on account of its also being motivated by the particular concerns and interests of the inquirer. Despite these similarities, Gadamer nevertheless sees a real distinction between philosophy and practical reasoning. Philosophy, the chapter argues, is unique in that it is motivated by breakdowns in our concepts and not only in our habits, and thus issues in reflection on the essences of things rather than deliberation about how to act. The second half of the chapter fleshes out Gadamer’s view of philosophy by considering his criticisms of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s philosophical quietism. Though Gadamer and Wittgenstein agree that language is irreducibly tied to some concrete social practice, Wittgenstein fails to appreciate the role that language plays in the ever-ongoing transformation of our social institutions and practices. This blind spot leaves Wittgenstein unable to appreciate the possibility of genuine philosophical dialogue, that is, of a shared thinking-things-through that goes beyond the therapeutic treatment of misunderstandings.
