ABSTRACT
Already in 1996 Daniel Callahan and Margot White argued that all legal arrangements aiming at reducing the risks of legalization will necessarily be mere Potemkin villages. This chapter uses the evidence assembled during 20 years of research about the Dutch and Belgian legal systems for checking their argument.
I consider what we know about physicians’ knowledge of the law and the impact that the legal requirements have on their decisions. They are legally obligated to consult at least one independent colleague. Is it true that these consultants only give the doctors the advice that they want to hear? In both countries both doctors and consultants are required to report to a review committee, but these committees only rarely conclude that the reporting doctor hasn't satisfied the legal requirements of due care. Doesn't this show that such committees are mere paper tigers? In order to assess this criticism, I consider the ways in which the committees communicate with the medical community and the nature of their assessments. Even in the rare cases of a negative judgement by the review committees, legal authorities nearly always abstain from prosecution. Doesn't this show that the whole system is all bark and no bite?
