ABSTRACT
Negative advance directives, prohibiting life-prolonging treatments, are legally binding in many countries, positive ones, requesting euthanasia, are only legally valid although not binding in the Netherlands. They are the subject of intense debate. The usual format of this discussion is to consider it as a matter of priority between conflicting viewpoints. Should we follow the former person who has decided that she wants to end her life before she loses the capacity to make self-regarding decisions? Or the present demented person who has no such wish at all and may seem to be quite happy? In terms of Ronald Dworkin's influential distinction: should we prioritize the ‘critical’ interests of the former person, or the ‘experiential interests’ of the later one?
In this chapter I criticize this framing of the problem. The interests that people have as regards the shape of their life as a whole should be seen as interests of the person, not the ‘former person’, whether or not the person is presently still aware of having them. And the famous Epicurean argument against the badness of death has this kernel of truth: an interest in survival can only be of that kind.
