ABSTRACT
What is the content of a belief experience, What is the intending relation? It does seem that the answer to these questions, which springs most naturally to the human mind, is that a belief experience is an experience of imagery, that the content is the intrinsic sensible character of the imagery, and that the intending relation is resemblance of a certain kind. British empiricists of the past usually seem to have tended to some such view as this, while those philosophers who have rejected such a view have treated it as a widespread and natural mistake which it must be their first task to correct. Philosophers of the Brentano mental act tradition felt the need to make it plain that their contents were not images or image-properties, while Twardowski, who introduced the notion of content, started by thinking of contents in just these terms. 1 Bertrand Russell espoused a largely image view of belief in The Analysis of Mind. Moreover, there is not exactly a wealth of alternative views which do more than present a tidy terminology. Let us see then whether anything can be done with an imagist theory of believing.
