ABSTRACT
I may notice the exemplification of a universal by a material thing, or I may notice the exemplification of a universal by a sense-datum. The former is a more complex affair than the latter, though in fact the latter normally only occurs as an element in the former. Noticing the exemplification of a universal by a material thing involves noticing some character of a given sensedatum and having a belief that a material thing of a certain character is present. Believing is the subject of Part Three of this book. In this chapter, therefore, we shall confine ourselves to the more elementary phenomenon of noticing some characteristic of a sense-datum, or of some other immediately experienced object, or of an experience, and the phrase ‘noticing a universal’ will refer to this phenomenon alone. Without some such discussion of at least this most elementary sort of noticing of universals our discussion of universals would be left disconnected too long from any discussion of our mental relation to them. This chapter also supplements our discussion of the sensing of sense-data in Chapter II, section 3.
