ABSTRACT
This chapter engages with the normative concerns regarding the power of government networks and the opposition to it brought about by legislative reluctance. It looks at the desirability of policy options for global financial governance that are constrained by a financial trilemma. The chapter then looks at two quality indicators of government networks, namely, effectiveness and legitimacy. It shows how the effectiveness of government networks rests on the power of reputation. Regarding legitimacy, the chapter looks at the feasibility and desirability of electoral democracy in global governance. It assesses the FSB and government networks against two standards of procedural legitimacy, namely, stakeholder inclusion and deliberative equality. Finally, the chapter argues that while the institutional design of government network is more effective than its critics would admit, significant improvements in legitimacy can be made. It advocates for the incorporation of elected experts in global governance in the form of an expert council. The chapter suggests that this institutional innovation may combine the benefits of technocratic sophistication and electoral accountability.
