ABSTRACT
Constructing a theory of obligations in international law is a complex and certainly controversial task. Opposition to the creation of this theory stems primarily from the existence of an increasingly developed theory of the sources of international law, as well as a theory of responsibility for internationally wrongful acts. However, there are a number of serious arguments justifying the development of obligation theory as a kind of link between source theory and responsibility theory. The fundamental argument is the inadequacy of both theories. This is because the former focuses on sources as instruments of legal regulation, which provides very limited insight into the content of sources. The second theory, on the other hand, is concerned with obligations but focuses attention on breaches of obligations. This creates a conceptual gap. It is filled by the theory of obligations, which, on the one hand, compels an analysis of the specific rights and related obligations that arise from the sources of law and, on the other hand, positively defines the nature and types of obligations, the freedom to enter into them, the rules and standards for their performance, defines the conditions for the performance of obligations, the rules for inducing the parties to fulfil them, the management of this process, and the security of the performance, as well as the ways to ensure the stability and continuity of the performance process.
