ABSTRACT
This chapter addresses the second stage of a paradigm's life cycle. It presupposes that an example or an exemplar/paradigm has already been identified and named. Based on Wittgenstein's reflections on the topic, the first section considers the problem of how a series of examples can lead someone to grasp a concrete universal. Wittgenstein focuses on the moment when we can exclaim, “Now I know how to go on!” The second section investigates the relationship between paradigms and rules. Several interpretations of Wittgenstein's private language argument are considered. If a private language is impossible, so are private paradigms. The final section assumes a destructive perspective. A series of examples can reveal an inner dynamic that Derrida calls “la autre loi.” This other law can lead to an exemplar, but it can also divert its movement elsewhere. This chapter argues that there is a kind of différance between (singular) examples and (particular) exemplars. What an example exemplifies-that is, the exemplarity of the example-eludes any fixed identity and follows a logic of supplementarity. Exemplarity, then, oscillates between a singular example and a particular exemplar.
