ABSTRACT
The aim of this chapter is to develop Wittgenstein's suggestion that Plato's Forms are analogous to standards. I propose the following formulation of the analogy: a Form is to its instances as the Standard Pound is to other objects that weigh the same as the Standard Pound. I articulate this analogy in light of Wittgenstein's views on standards as presented in §50 of the Philosophical Investigations and elsewhere. For Plato, Forms are the unchangeable and intelligible causes of phenomenal things, separate from the world of becoming. I argue that the Forms-as-standards analogy can provide nonmetaphysical explanations for these key characteristics. The analogy can also dispel confusions surrounding the Third Man Argument by suggesting a kind of Dual Predication theory. According to this analogy, Forms are not transcendent entities residing in a “third realm.” The view presented in this chapter is thus very far from what is usually called “Platonism,” i.e., a postulation of the real existence of abstract objects.
