ABSTRACT

Chapter 3 outlines ICCJ: the novel account of voluntary consent proposed in this book. It explains that ICCJ advances three distinctive views. First, it holds that influences on a person’s decision-making invalidate consent only if they induce a certain type of motivation, but regardless of whether they do so directly or through deviant causal chains. Second, ICCJ maintains that only ‘interpersonally unjustifiable’ influences invalidate consent. Thus, it is the notion of interpersonal justification that allows us to distinguish those influences on a person’s decision-making that negate the voluntariness of his consent from other influences that do not. Third, ICCJ asserts that it is ultimately only the consent-receiver’s influences, or his conduct more generally, that invalidates consent, even in cases where the influences are exerted by third parties. On this basis, the chapter elaborates further on the principles that determine whether something is interpersonally justifiable. It is here that the chapter develops a second-personal account of autonomy, outlines the significance of beneficence in the context of medical consent, and formulates three specific principles for ICCJ, which are labelled Assisted Decision-Making, Equal Moral Standing, and Trusted Partner.