ABSTRACT
The term ‘sense-datum’ was probably first introduced into philosophy by G. E. Moore in lectures given in 1910-11 but published only in 1953 under the title Some Main Problems of Philosophy. Bertrand Russell read these lectures and used the term in his own Problems of Philosophy. The connection of the notion of a sense-datum with the notions of direct apprehension or knowledge by acquaintance is important. For, however sense-data are to be identified, it is as objects of direct apprehension that they are to be defined. Phenomenology is logically dependent upon people's knowledge of a world independent of ourselves, and while the phenomenology of their experiences may be extremely rich and varied, it can never constitute a datum upon which their perception of the world may depend. The phenomenological method has had some results within empirical psychology in so far as its aim is to provide an adequate and unprejudiced account of the phenomena to be dealt with.
