ABSTRACT
This chapter covers price-influencing tactics at auction. It discusses the civil-law and competition-law implications thereof. Such tactics in principle distort the competition. However, it is not always clear whether and, if so, under which conditions these tactics are illicit. The aim of this chapter is to find the demarcation line between licit and illicit price-influencing tactics. The first section covers fictitious bidding by or on behalf of the seller (sham bidding). The second section covers agreements on the abstention from bidding. It covers bid-rigging for the account of a single bidder (pacta de non licitando), bid-rigging for the account of several bidders (auction rings) and bona fide partnerships for the joint account of the bidders’ consortium. It is argued that price-enhancing tactics should be allowed with respect to the sale with reserve until the bidding reaches the reserve, if the existence of the reserve and the seller’s right to bid were disclosed to the bidders before the sale. It is also argued that bona fide partnerships should be allowed since pooling financial assets into a single bidding consortium strengthens the overall financial capacities of the bidders, to the benefit of the seller. The conclusion summarises the main findings of the chapter.
