ABSTRACT
This chapter discusses Nicholas Wolterstorff’s book Divine Discourse, and the distinction Wolterstorff draws in it between divine revelation and God’s speaking. The chapter argues that this distinction is much less sharp than Wolterstorff implies, and that the idea of God’s speaking is logically parasitic on the idea of God’s revealing. In particular, the chapter argues that some speaking is revealing. It also focuses on cases of agents’ self-revelation that are (a) intended (b) non-manifestational (i.e. propositional) and (c) intransitive (‘INIS revelations’). It is argued that all cases of INIS revelation are cases of saying, that is, they have assertion as their medium. The chapter also argues that, in God’s case, the contrast between manifestational and non-manifestational revelation narrows, and, in consequence, revelation by proposition tends to supplant revelation by natural sign. The chapter concludes by arguing that taking something as a possible case of divine speaking, particularly if it is an instance of revelation by deputation or appropriation, logically requires a background of INIS revelation, and that if God makes a revelation by means of an INIS revelation, then he can, at the time of the original revelation or at some subsequent time, authorize that revelation as his present speech.
