ABSTRACT
This chapter considers W. W. Bartley’s defence of ‘pancritical rationalism’ against classical rationalism and empiricism. Bartley’s argument is that the rival theory of foundationalism fares no better than irrationalism, since foundationalism has no answer if one makes irrationalism one’s basic commitment. Bartley aims to show in response that if, with pancritical rationalism, the idea of epistemic justification is abandoned, then it is possible to choose in a nonarbitrary way among competing theories.
The chapter argues in response that Bartley fails to show that his view is superior to those that it seeks to replace, since what he in fact provides is not an argument for the superiority of pancritical rationalism but, rather, a mere proposal about the formation of beliefs. It is contended, firstly, that there is nothing to stop an irrationalist from taking up a position corresponding to the one Bartley takes up as a pancritical rationalist, and, secondly, that, contrary to Bartley, there is no asymmetry between his critical position and the irrationalist equivalent.
The chapter concludes that Bartley is mistaken in thinking that pancritical rationalism has been shown to be superior by some objectively valid argument.
