ABSTRACT
This chapter compares and contrasts a Wittgensteinian approach to religion (WR) and so-called reformed epistemology (RE). Each of WR and RE denies that to be rationally tenable religious belief requires vindication by non-religious considerations, and insists that the belief that God exists is not an isolated belief, contingently related to other beliefs and the practice of religion. WR and RE differ in that RE supports, but WR does not, the sense of asking second-order questions about religious beliefs. They also differ in that RE supports, but WR does not, the propriety of admitting defeaters. A third difference is that RE, unlike WR, allows that sound instances of natural theology may be possible and may serve to strengthen the believer’s faith. Also, WR goes further than RE in denying externalism not only with respect to justification but also with respect to meaning and understanding. WR and RE also differ in their view of reality, with RE regarding it as a unity and WR holding that there are different realities, with the reality of religion not overlapping with that of science.
