ABSTRACT
The goal of this chapter is to put the pathological complexity thesis to the test by responding to the argument that there could be a phylogenetic split between animals that plausibly only have evaluative experience (i.e. gastropods) and those that only have sensory experience (i.e. insects). Since the pathological complexity thesis rests on the idea that the core and origins of consciousness lie in hedonic evaluation, the former group offers evidence for the thesis whereas the latter constituted a challenge that has to be overcome. By reviewing the literature and discussing the life histories of arthropods, this chapter argues that even those animals that are presently the strongest case for the independent existence of sensory experience turn out to have rich evaluative capacities after all. Furthermore, it discusses octopuses as a challenge to our human-centric thinking about selfhood, fish and non-avian reptiles with their natural split brains as a challenge to synchronic unity, and finally corvids with their spectacular memory capacities as a challenge to our thinking about diachronic experience. In line with the mission of this book, these discussions also involve recourse to pathological conditions of consciousness, such as aphantasia.
