ABSTRACT
In the opening chapter of the second part we discuss the relationship between law and other kinds of values. Can law be understood without including any necessary reference to those values that it may seem desirable for law to embody, notably morality and justice? The traditions of legal positivism and natural law diverge around these questions. We look at the key concepts of validity and legality, the former as identified with positivism, the latter with natural law, and we discuss the positivist theories of Austin, Hart, and Kelsen, and the natural law theories of Gustav Radbruch, Lon Fuller, John Finnis, and Jeremy Waldron. Within the natural law tradition there is a key differentiation between theories that rely on the identification of formal features (Fuller's inner morality and Waldron's “procedural” defence of the rule of law), and on the other hand natural lawyers like Radbruch and Finnis for whom the necessary connection between law and morality concerns the content of law.
