ABSTRACT
The chapter focuses on Utilitarianism and its relation to Smith’s “doctrine of philosophy”. Two issues stand out: the role of utilitarian morality in the welfare indices of the Wealth of Nations, and the tension between the deontological morals of natural rights and the consequentialist morals of economics. For the most part, The Theory of Moral Sentiments presents a non-utilitarian account of morals, while WN seems to be the opposite. To avoid the confusion of placing all of Smithian moral theory under the formal banner of Utilitarianism, welfare criteria, are treated as instances of consequentialist ethical reasoning. The chapter discusses efficiency, justice, and distributive justice as the main ethical categories deployed in WN. The chapter also offers some evidence showing the conflict between the two systems of ethics—the deontological and the consequential. It also argues that sympathy in Smith and in the Utilitarians are different concepts that serve different philosophical purposes. There is no inconsistency in Smith since he singles out economic policy as one area where we rightly judge actions by their social consequences. However, there are important areas of tension, which suggest that Smithian natural rights cannot be subsumed under utilitarian justifications.
