ABSTRACT
Data show that after three relatively successful coups, the Pakistan military is no longer interested in another takeover. It appears to have accepted that it does not possess the requisite skills to run the country. That does not mean that the military intends to give up its authoritarian role. It simply means that it has discovered new avenues of concretising its hegemony without having to transgress accepted boundaries of civil-military relations. The Pakistan military’s hegemony is neither defined by nor limited to the duration of a coup. While in power, it installed a regime of laws and policies which ensure that even when not directly in control, the balance of power is tipped in the hegemon’s favour. In order to make a case for how indirect form of hegemony extends beyond the conventional ‘developmental’ role of the military we need to understand how hegemony has been understood so far. This chapter focuses on understanding the exercise of hegemony; practices that the literature treats as evidence of the military’s preponderance in the country. It will discuss some of the methods employed to intrude upon quintessentially civil spheres.
