ABSTRACT
The Cartesian picture of mindedness is that it lies behind behaviour; this contrasts with a Wittgensteinian view according to which mindedness is revealed in behaviour. The aim of this chapter is to subvert the Cartesian picture, and to suggest that Shakespeare does not presuppose it. Following John McDowell, it is argued that the fact that we are fallible in the exercise of our ability to see into another’s mind does not mean that we do not have that ability. Indeed the very possibility of deception depends on the ordinary accessibility of our minds to others. Normally, and necessarily, we are right to take behavioural appearances at (as we aptly say) face value. Deceptions in Shakespeare are sooner or later exposed, and his depictions of deception are fully compatible with a Wittgensteinian rejection of the Cartesian view of mind as essentially hidden. The general point here is the Davidsonian (originally Wittgensteinian) one, that getting things wrong only makes sense against a background of, by and large, getting things right. So communication, for example, only works because mistakes and failures are relatively unusual. It is suggested that we can regard Iago as a transcendental freerider, in the sense that he is exploiting a possibility of failure in the communicative system which, if replicated sufficiently often, would undermine the system.
