ABSTRACT
This chapter deals with the scope and role afforded to conventional military strategy in the third nuclear age and how advertent escalation responses are tied into conventional military doctrines and postures. It introduces the concept of “instrumentalized” conventional capabilities where conventional deterrence is instrumentalized towards coercion, but this is different from direct nuclear coercion, even though the threat of escalation to higher levels in the conflict is involved. The chapter argues that there has been a shift from deterrence based conventional strategies, to conventional strategies based essentially on the logic of compellence, and that conventional strategy has been lent a cross-level framework of operation. Implying that deterrent or compellent objective of the conventional forces is determined by the orientation of the peacetime strategies of nuclear armed states which is inevitably found to be compellent in nature across dyads. This chapter also looks at the point of transition between conventional and nuclear warfare in a conflict and argues that such a point is very particular and subjective to the nuclear dyad in consideration where first use of a tactical nuclear weapon could have different interpretations depending on the state of the conflict. Overall, it looks at the political intent that conventional strategies seek to serve and how advertent escalation, including use of tactical nuclear weapons, may tie into that strategy.
