ABSTRACT
This chapter sets the stage for an exposition of Fichte’s mature theory of freedom in the Jena period by providing an overview of the systematic context from within which the theory is developed. It briefly recounts the proof of practical reason in both its indirect and indirect form in the Foundations of the Entire Doctrine of Science. It investigates how Fichte’s practical rationalism is evidenced by the role of pure practical reason in three areas of his system. First, it is apparent in his espousal in Critique (or metaphilosophy) of a coherentism which is based on performative consistency. Second, it is evident from his account of the theory of original reality (or metaphysics) of the matter of experience in terms of an original reality that is constitutive of an intelligible, moral world. Third, it is manifest in his contention in the theory of (self-)consciousness that the ideal, theoretical acts of representing, perceiving, and cognizing are no less dependent on the real, practical acts of projecting a concept of an end, willing, effectuating as the latter is dependent on the former.
