ABSTRACT
Indications & warning (I&W) intelligence fell out of fashion following the demise of the Soviet Union. One reason for this volte-face was that the United States and its allies enjoyed a distinct military advantage over likely opponents—forces were available in theater to cope with most of the contingencies likely to be encountered. Today, the steady growth in the size and capability of Beijing's military has made it increasingly difficult for the United States and its friends and allies across the Western Pacific to respond effectively to a PRC initiative with the forces maintained in a typical peacetime “day-alert” posture. Instead, forces will need to be “generated” by curtailing routine activities, completing ongoing maintenance, and focusing logistics on combat readiness to maximize unit availability in the required theater of operations. This chapter describes I&W intelligence as a system that can strengthen the U.S. maritime deterrent in the Western Pacific. It also explores the various stratagems that might be adopted to complicate the efforts of I&W analysts to generate warnings and associated responses to untoward developments.
