ABSTRACT

The Arab boycott during the Ramadan war in October 1973 was not the first time that the Arabs had used oil as a political weapon. In 1948, 1956, and again in 1967 during the Six-Day war, the Arabs had tried many times to use their ultimate weapon, but their attempts were thwarted by the hard economic and political realities of the time and by the political indecision of their leadership. With nationalization, the West European nations, whose economies depended to a large extent on Middle East oil and oil products, sensed an immediate threat to the security of their sea-borne commerce. It was estimated that ‘the United Kingdom had reserves of oil which would last for six weeks, and that the other countries of Western Europe owned comparatively smaller stocks’. Nationalization of the Canal was regarded as a challenge to the entire Western politico-economic conceptual framework for the Middle East.