ABSTRACT
Classical Liberalism, like any other ideology, is in need of the resources that can only be provided by a normative theory. As soon as Locke’s theory is secularized, it is no longer clear what connects the theory to our values.
Utilitarianism is scrutinized for its suitability for this purpose and found wanting. The chapter begins with the most influential version of this theory, John Stuart Mill’s version of Rule Utilitarianism and subsequently traces its development into a contemporary version known as Preference Utilitarianism. This is the normative tradition most likely to judge Classical Liberalism favourably, though even here the agreement is far from perfect. Preference Utilitarianism serves admirably to give a moral dimension to the arguments supportive of the policy prescriptions of Classical Liberalism (it’s about making the world a better place). Unfortunately, in one important respect it is at odds with the conceptual foundations of Classical Liberalism. Utilitarianism denies that there are such things as inalienable rights which the theories of Locke and Nozick presume as the very foundation of property rights and the freedoms required for genuine agency in the marketplace. Moreover, it instrumentalizes our relationships to one another in ways that are at odds with trust and social capital.
