ABSTRACT
In this chapter, discussion on the close relation between explanation and prediction in both natural and social sciences has been done. Thinkers like Hempel, Popper etc. are of the view that both explanation and prediction are structurally identical. In the context of the covering law model, explanation and prediction are the two sides of the same coin. But thinkers like Scheffler, Scriven and Toulmin have criticised this thesis of structural identity by presenting several examples where the symmetry between the explanation and prediction seems to break down. Regarding scientific prediction in the field of social sciences, Peter Winch is of the view that the main hurdle against prediction in the human sphere is man’s capacity for choice and decision. There will always be a possibility of any person taking a different decision from what we have calculated about him because of these capacities.
Expressing his views regarding predictability of social events, Popper has distinguished between two kinds of predictions – ‘short-term conditional scientific predictions’ and ‘historicist prophecy’. As society is not governed by laws; at most it is governed by trends and trends are not laws; thus, short-term conditional predictions may be possible in the realm of social affairs but long-term prophecy is completely ruled out according to Popper. But the anti-naturalists would not subscribe to this view.
