ABSTRACT
This chapter analyzes how the culturally rooted attitudes within the Bush administration and the Sharon and Olmert governments informed the policy debates and key decisions made toward the Iranian nuclear program (INP). This is followed by an assessment of the influence of the material factors present in each country. The Bush administration was informed by both primacy and realist internationalism. Initially, advocates of primacy set the tone, rejecting direct negotiations and pushing for coercive measures, including sanctions and enforcing the zero-enrichment demand by force. Later, Bush moderated his policy toward the realist internationalist position by agreeing to participate in talks on condition that Iran first suspend enrichment. Though his room for maneuver became highly constrained by the Iraq War, his policy remained fundamentally coercive and he continued to demand zero enrichment. Reflecting defensive realist preferences, Sharon and Olmert felt that Israel’s highest priority lay in resolving the Palestinian issue, either by unilateral withdrawal or by offering wide-ranging diplomatic concessions. They also agreed that Israel should not take the lead in opposing the INP, but rather be a supporting actor in an international coalition led by the United States. To this end, they shared intelligence with foreign governments and pursued covert sabotage operations.
