ABSTRACT
This chapter analyzes how the culturally rooted attitudes within the Obama administration and the second Netanyahu government informed the policy debates and key decisions made toward the Iranian nuclear program. This is followed by an assessment of the influence of the material factors present in each country. The Obama administration was informed by both realist and progressive internationalism. In the first term, realist internationalists were dominant and demanded zero enrichment and a coercive negotiating posture. In the second term, progressive internationalists were dominant, shifting toward conciliatory diplomacy and conceding that Iran retain enrichment capabilities, provided it did not weaponize. There was also a cautious hope that a resolution of the nuclear issue might allow for a more fundamental change in the US–Iran relationship. Assertive realism returned to dominance in 2009 under Netanyahu, according to which world powers could not be relied upon to apply sufficient pressure for Iran to abandon its nuclear aspirations; therefore, Israel must take lead responsibility to ensure sufficient force is applied. Israel developed the capacity for a military strike and issued credible threats to implement it. Israel came out against the emerging Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, arguing that allowing Iran industrial nuclear infrastructure was worse than having no deal.
