ABSTRACT
The chapter discusses the distinction between affect and signification, passing through an exchange on the matter between Yannis Stavrakakis, Jason Glynos and Ernesto Laclau. It is argued that the two realms are separable and even opposed. Once again, however, the condition for this is the removal of the category of hegemony from the picture, since, while psychoanalytically inflected affect is seen to produce a whole series of new concepts in the work of Laclau (essentially those related to temporality – ‘universality’, ‘the empty signifier’, dislocation’, not to mention the objet a), the hegemonic logic does not allow all of their consequences to be drawn out. This argument is based on Jacques Lacan’s theory of sexual difference, and his formulae of sexuation. Thus, it is asserted that popular affect is excessive – something like a residue of signification – but also productive. The theoretical inspiration for this position is Lacan’s distinction between phallic jouissance and Other jouissance. Moreover, affect understood in this way is once again seen to precipitate singularities, i.e. the ‘one-by-one’ of women that is precipitated in Lacan’s thesis that ‘woman does not exist’.
