ABSTRACT
This chapter does not only emphasize the rhetorical dimension of multi-modal arguments in the judicial context, being the most formal and official of all the legal frameworks, but also their dialectical aspect. The dialectical concept of legal argument is close to what O’Keefe designated as argument 1 (argument “made”). In such a manner, we discuss arguments trying to show how they work as “products” independent of the speaker as much as possible. However, O’Keefe also spoke of argument 2 (argument “had”). As such, it is characterized by natural language, imprecise formulations, power differentials, and weird moves like non-sequiturs that are completely normal in a human interaction. In such a manner this kind of argument is closer to the rhetorical concept of argument. Although having dialectical dimensions, multi-modal argumentation is, with its emphasis on the alternate modes, close to a rhetorical tradition. In the context of law, it helps us disclose hidden spots between logic and psychology, thereby presenting a somewhat bridge to cross that gap. It, however, helps us realize that such kinds of “spots” may be valid complements to traditional argumentation.
