ABSTRACT
Duopolistic rule between the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) has characterized the subnational political settlement of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) since the early 1990s. The traditional mistrust between these parties was entrenched in the Kurdistan Regional Government’s institutions after 2005, including its security forces. Simultaneously, relations between Erbil and Baghdad remained tense due to persistent disputes about territory, oil and money. These structural parameters, together with several shocks – budget cuts from Baghdad (e.g. 2014), Islamic State (2014), the rise of the YPG and Turkey’s fight against the PKK (2015) and the Kurdish independence referendum (2017) – lie at the root of the coercive profiles the KDP and PUK Peshmerga adopted between 2003 and 2021. Toward each other, they consistently maintained a hybrid coercive profile, alternating collaboration with competition in governing the KRI. Toward Baghdad, they shifted from a government coercive profile supporting the US to a hybrid coercive profile under Prime Minister Al-Maliki and an anti-government coercive profile when the opportunity arose to take Kirkuk. KDP and PUK Peshmerga forces fell back on a hybrid coercive profile once their territorial gains were undone after the independence referendum and have maintained this position since.
