ABSTRACT

Elite factions operating armed organizations engage in shifts of coercive profile, but such shifts are neither frequent nor regular. They are typically preceded by a gradual expansion of an elite faction’s power base that avoids direct armed confrontation with peers. Inter- and/or transnational support often plays a role. In particular, operating on the basis of a hybrid coercive profile enables an elite faction to exploit opportunities to further expand its power base with greater degrees of freedom, tolerable risks and without overthrowing the political settlement completely. Key strategies elite factions can pursue under a hybrid coercive profile include gradual institutional capture, launching a direct competitive challenge to other elite factions short of war, or preparing a shift to an anti-government coercive profile. Adopting a hybrid coercive profile is possible in political settlements with weaker power arrangements (hub-and-spoke or multi-nodal) and in political settlements with stronger power arrangements (hierarchic or hierarchically networked) once they start to weaken due to civil war. Peacemaking and security sector reform practices in pursuit of sustainable peace and functional government can be improved by paying greater analytical attention to the evolution of the power base and coercive profile of armed organizations engaged in state-making processes before, during and after conflict.