ABSTRACT
The principle of indifference supplies a satisfaction of Salmon’s Ascertainability criterion for some philosophical theories of probability that take an epistemic view of probability. The origins and variety of formulations of the principle of indifference are explored briefly. The normative ground and structure of the principle of indifference have been almost entirely neglected in the literature on the paradoxes. Here I rectify that neglect. What is presupposed by and what is defined by the principle are disentangled, on which basis its determination of quantities and normative roles are properly articulated. This leads to a comprehensive definition of the principle including a definition of its inputs and outputs, both in its most general form and in its generation of subordinate principles with narrower domains of application. This more accurate formulation of the principle avoids some of the simplest paradoxes due to a feature I call its generality, which feature plays a significant role throughout the book. Finally, the relation of consilient formal derivations is demonstrated.
