ABSTRACT
The most important points in judging Pareto’s work are: first, that the complexity of his theory is not inherent in its structure but in the material with which it deals; and, second, that the analysis of the primary elements of action justifies his descriptive concepts, like ‘equilibrium’, ‘social system’ or ‘the circulation of élites’. The ‘oscillation’ of derivations—e.g. between reason and intuition—is caused chiefly, according to Pareto, by a confusion between the ‘social utility’ of a theory or doctrine and its consistency with experience. The distinction which Pareto makes between logico-experimental reasoning and derivation is not a distinction in the form of reasoning, but in the substantive values of the elements of reasoning. Pareto’s theory of utility adds the decisive point to the hypothesis of correlation between theories, doctrines etc. and social reality. Pareto remarks that the Romans dealt with facts as they chose but adhered strictly to forms or rather certain associations of ideas and acts.
